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2) V. Mathieu, Kants Opus postumum, hrsg. von G. Held, Frankfurt a. M.1989, S. 269. 














とはできないという批判が下されている（z.B. K. Pollok, Kants >>Metaphysische 






























Carrier, Kant's Mechanical Determination of Matter in the Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science, in: Kant and the Sciences, ed. by E. Watkins, New York, 2001, p. 
123f.を参照）
9）例えば、松山害ー『ニュートンとカント（改訂版）』、晃洋書房、 2006年、 169頁。










Baumgarten, Metaphysica, Halle, 41757 .）による。
14）これについては、ワトキンスの論文に詳しい。 vgl.E. Watkins, Kant’s 
Justification of the Laws of Mechanics, in: Kant and the Sciences, Oxford & New 
York 2001. 
15) E. Watkins, The Laws of Motion from Newton to Kant, in: Perspectives on Science, 








していたのか否かは不明であるという他ない。 Vgl. K. Pollok, ibid., S. 202. 
17）言うまでもなくニュートンの『プリンキピア』の表題は「阜盆主主旦数学的
原理jであるが、カントは「原理』においてこれを「皇盆珪主旦数学的原理
(mathem[atische] Grundlehren der Nat[ur]Wiss[enschaft]) Jと表記している。フリー
ドマンはこの理由を、カントが数学的原理と哲学的原理を区別しなければな
らないと考えていたことを反映しているのではないかと推測している（vgl.M. 
























いJと語っている。 Vgl. I. Newton, An Account of the Book Entitled Commercium 
Epistolicum, in: Newton Philosophical Writings, ed. by A. Janiak, Cambridge, 2004, p. 
123.）。
19) V gl. A. Janiak, Newton, Oxford, 2015, p. 37, 89. 
20）ニュートン『プリンキピア』からの引用は、モッテ英訳（I.Newton, The 







トンのこうした議論には届いていないJ(K. Pollok, ibid., S. 306）。カントが「原
理』においてニュートンが重力を本質的性質として数えていない点に関して引
用しているのは、『プリンキピアJのこの筒所ではなく、『光学」第二編序文（I.





22) R. Toretti, The Philosophy of Physics, Cambridge, 1999, p. 74. 
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Ontology and Experience 
- The Method of Kant' s Metaphysics of Nature 
Taichi SHIMAZAKI 
Graduate School of Letters (Doctor's Degree Program), Hiroshima University 
The aim of this article is to clarify the role of the "empirical concept of matter" in 
Kant's plan of metaphysics of nature by considering the background in the history 
of philosophy and science. Kant divides metaphysics of nature into "transcendental 
part", or general metaphysics, which is also called ontology, and special metaphysical 
natural science called "metaphysics of corporeal nature", for which the empirical 
concept of matter is required as its ground. Kant explains that metaphysics of nature 
must contain the metaphysical foundations of "concept of motion, of impenetrability 
(the filling of space), of inertia, and so on", to make possible the application of 
mathematics to natural science. This concept is a bridge between general and special 
(corporeal nature's) metaphysics. For it is by adding this empirical concept to the 
general, "transcendental" principle (for example, "all change has cause") that we obtain 
the concrete, "(special) metaphysical" one, such as the proposition "all change (of 
states of matter) has an external cause", from the mechanics chapter of Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science as the third law (proposition 3). It is important to 
acknowledge the difference that Kant treats the laws of mechanics as propositions (for 
which demonstration is required), while Newton's laws of motion were axioms (from 
which many propositions are demonstrated). But Kant sees a certain metaphysical 
postulate even in Newton's mathematical and experimental position. He says that 
-49-
Newton must have had metaphysical views of matter in mind, otherwise he could not 
argue for a universal property of matter such as gravitation. His intention is to lay 
further foundations for Newton's tacit postulate. The empirical concept of matter is a 
task for which the metaphysical foundations must be established, which is the ground 
of such application of mathematics as Newton attempted. 
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